Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Volume Two.



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT
IN TWO VOLUMES.


VOLUME II.


PREFACE.  [To both volumes]

"Man proposes and God disposes."  There are but few important events in the 
affairs of men brought about by their own choice.

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I had determined never 
to do so, nor to write anything for publication.  At the age of nearly sixty-two 
I received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it 
did not apparently affect my general health.  This made study a pleasant 
pastime.  Shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by 
the announcement of a failure.  This was followed soon after by universal 
depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good 
part of the income still retained, and for which I am indebted to the kindly act 
of friends.  At this juncture the editor of the Century Magazine asked me to 
write a few articles for him. I consented for the money it gave me; for at that 
moment I was living upon borrowed money.  The work I found congenial, and I 
determined to continue it.  The event is an important one for me, for good or 
evil; I hope for the former.

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon the task with the 
sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the National or 
Confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention 
often where special mention is due.  There must be many errors of omission in 
this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in 
such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged.  There were 
thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental 
and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here 
alluded to.  The troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed 
reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds.

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before I had 
reason to suppose I was in a critical condition of health.  Later I was reduced 
almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to 
anything for weeks.  I have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, 
often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work.  I 
would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if I could have 
allowed myself more time.  I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my 
eldest son, F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records 
every statement of fact given.  The comments are my own, and show how I saw the 
matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not.

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but 
hoping they will meet the approval of the reader.

U.  S.  GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885.




PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING 
MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT 
CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--
BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII. CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S 
SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION--SHERMAN'S 
MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE 
ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN--GENERAL 
HOOKER'S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY-
-PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING 
KNOXVILLE--CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--
COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED 
TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERAL 
BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION--
SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX. SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL 
MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN--
ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT 
FLANK.

CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND 
WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT--LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS 
RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK--REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THE 
MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR-
-CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE--
VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII. RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD--
EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION 
OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG --CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF 
THE WELDON RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII. SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE 
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--
THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI. EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THE 
EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

CHAPTER LXII. SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED 
TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, 
SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII. ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE 
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN 
DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE-
-THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV. INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--
SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM 
THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV. THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG--
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI. BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE 
WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII. NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S HOUSE--
THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII. MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND 
SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT 
LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE OF 
MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION-- CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S 
QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S 
ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON--
ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX



Begin Volume Two



CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING MILITARY 
DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI-- ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my arrival 
at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed 
immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an officer of the 
War Department with my instructions.  I left Cairo within an hour or two after 
the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis. Just as the train 
I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis a messenger came running 
up to stop it, saying the Secretary of War was coming into the station and 
wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent 
conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.  
Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War Department and my 
headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or 
two.  On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, 
whom I had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances.  Mr. 
Stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and 
accompanied me to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left 
Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches that I had 
better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve 
Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that 
I might take my choice of them.  The two were identical in all but one 
particular.  Both created the "Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the 
command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the 
Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River 
north of Banks's command in the south-west.  One order left the department 
commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas 
to his place.  I accepted the latter.  We reached Louisville after night and, if 
I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain.  The Secretary of War told me 
afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected 
to recover.  He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news at the 
capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the 
campaigns.  By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of 
discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both 
Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in Louisville.  
In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. 
Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would 
retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the 
government the propriety of a movement against Mobile.  General Rosecrans had 
been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early 
in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own 
at first, considering it was on the defensive.  But after the investment of 
Vicksburg Bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in 
Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege.  I frequently wrote 
General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg.  By so 
doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay 
Chattanooga open to capture.  General Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, 
and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but 
that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, 
after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military 
maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time."  If true, the maxim 
was not applicable in this case.  It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive 
battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them.  I, however, 
was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans' 
front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than 
they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be 
returned.  Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching 
troops to raise the siege.  Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten 
days afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free 
to return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement 
against Mobile.  I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being 
depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to 
detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, 
while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened.  Mobile was 
important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by 
little else than artillery.  If threatened by land and from the water at the 
same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its 
defence.  Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg.  My judgment was 
overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of 
the country where it was thought they could render the most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and required 
assistance.  The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this 
assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.  It was therefore 
necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and 
through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and intrenched, and made 
himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving 
earlier partially compensated.  But he pushed on, with his forces very much 
scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him.  Then Bragg 
took the initiative.  Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get 
his army together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before 
the main battle was brought on.  The battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of 
September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and 
some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.  The corps under Major-
General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and 
McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but later, and with his 
troops in good order.  Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, 
overlooking Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, 
which Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the 
river road as far back as Bridgeport.  The National troops were now strongly 
intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River behind them and the 
enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line 
across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a 
large part of the way, in front of their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the 
forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans.  Long 
before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was 
moving east with most of the garrison of Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster.  It would not only 
have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would 
have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the Army 
of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or 
demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad 
between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to 
Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the 
Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of 
Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-
roads, both south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport.  
The distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing 
to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a 
circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing 
the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of 
which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of 
artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.  The men had been on half 
rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except 
beef driven from Nashville across the country.  The region along the road became 
so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga 
they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the 
lift." Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of 
saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of 
hard bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient 
shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.  What they had was 
well worn.  The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps 
of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was 
abundant.  The only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had 
been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up 
the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a 
landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It 
would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army 
would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding that I 
was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, 
including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them 
find me and send me to him at once.  About eleven o'clock I returned to the 
hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from 
the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me.  I hastened to 
the room of the Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-
gown.  Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch.  I 
immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the 
Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans.  I then telegraphed to him 
the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army of the 
Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, 
informing him at the same time that I would be at the front as soon as possible.  
A prompt reply was received from Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we 
starve."  I appreciated the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the 
condition of affairs which prompted it.  It looked, indeed, as if but two 
courses were open:  one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and proceeded as 
far as Nashville.  At that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point 
by night, so I remained in Nashville until the next morning.  Here I met for the 
first time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee.  He delivered a speech 
of welcome.  His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort.  It 
was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something 
would be expected from me in response.  I was relieved, however, the people 
assembled having apparently heard enough.  At all events they commenced a general 
hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great 
relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, that 
important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be 
held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's 
advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on their way 
from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a 
gunboat to convoy them; and to Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be 
put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson 
Alabama, after dark.  Rosecrans was there on his way north.  He came into my car 
and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation 
at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done.  
My only wonder was that he had not carried them out.  We then proceeded to 
Bridgeport, where we stopped for the night.  From here we took horses and made 
our way by Jasper and over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much 
rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and 
from wash-outs on the mountain sides.  I had been on crutches since the time of 
my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe 
to cross on horseback.  The roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons 
and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses.  At Jasper, some ten 
or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there was a halt.  General O. O. Howard had his 
headquarters there.  From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort 
to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms.  
We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on.  
The next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark.  I went directly to 
General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until I could 
establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects 
and to talk about the condition of affairs.  They pointed out on the map the 
line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling 
back upon.  If any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me.  I 
found General W. F. Smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the Army 
of the Cumberland.  I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no 
recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time.  
He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country 
so plainly that I could see it without an inspection.  I found that he had 
established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine 
found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river 
above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a 
second bridge, one flying bridge being there already.  He was also rapidly 
getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge.  In 
addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between Chattanooga 
and Bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river.  This boat 
consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a 
stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop 
or factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my arrival, 
and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of the Army of the 
Tennessee, headquarters in the field.  The request was at once complied with.



CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLE OF 
WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking 
Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff.  We 
crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached 
spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below 
Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy.  Here we left our horses back from 
the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket station of the 
enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were 
within easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our 
presence.  They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.  But, I 
suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, 
feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of 
them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--a cracker line, 
as the soldiers appropriately termed it.  They had been so long on short rations 
that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might 
reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs nearly 
due west.  It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, 
through which Chattanooga Creek runs.  To the east of the valley is Missionary 
Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating 
somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the Tennessee.  On the 
west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide 
water.  Just below the town the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to 
the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and 
river.  The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the 
mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South 
Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west of that, 
Raccoon Mountains.  Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost 
perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of 
cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more 
feet in height.  On the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower 
palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from 
the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge 
and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga 
valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the 
enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with 
pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and 
render it useless to us.  In addition to this there was an intrenched line in 
Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, 
to make the investment complete.  Besides the fortifications on Mission Ridge, 
there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits 
half-way up the front.  The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards 
the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse.  At one 
point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the 
valley and town, and from which both sides drew water.  The Union lines were 
shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the 
east, south, and west, and commanded the river below.  Practically, the Army of 
the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the 
river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies.  The 
Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of 
the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum, 
Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce 
Rosecrans.  It would have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up 
the few rations left there.  They were consequently left on the railroad, where 
supplies could be brought to them.  Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their 
concentration at Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I 
was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making 
it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops 
detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer 
and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following details 
were made:  General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to 
the south side of the Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to 
Brown's Ferry.  General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the 
Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back 
road, until opposite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear 
after he had passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act 
under General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under 
General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float 
by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, 
then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point.  
Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, 
by the north bank of the river to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the 
material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his eastward 
march.  At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream 
with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men.  Smith 
started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive.  There 
are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back 
of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the 
top of Lookout.  It was over this road Smith marched.  At five o'clock Hazen 
landed at Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it.  
By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in possession 
of a height commanding the ferry.  This was speedily fortified, while a detail 
was laying the pontoon bridge.  By ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our 
extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest 
of the army.  The two bridges over the Tennessee River--a flying one at 
Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, 
covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection 
complete.  Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of 
the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie.  Howard marched on to 
Brown's Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped 
three miles south.  The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, 
and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.  Between 
Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the 
mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond 
the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it.  To get up these rapids, 
steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore.  But 
there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's 
Ferry.  The latter point is only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with 
it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains 
on the south side of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the 
river opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and 
abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good supply 
of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of.  
Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation.  
His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but 
were in good condition.  In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was 
open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week 
the troops were receiving full rations.  It is hard for any one not an eye-
witness to realize the relief this brought.  The men were soon reclothed and 
also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness 
prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks.  Neither officers nor men looked 
upon themselves any longer as doomed.  The weak and languid appearance of the 
troops, so visible before, disappeared at once.  I do not know what the effect 
was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing.  
Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our 
condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report.  "These 
dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy 
evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.  Possessed of the 
shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, 
we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time."  But 
the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt not but thousands 
of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not.  
There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that 
the South was more to be benefited by its defeat than the North.  The latter had 
the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous 
nation.  The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized 
people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in 
ignorance, and enervated the governing class.  With the outside world at war 
with this institution, they could not have extended their territory.  The labor 
of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so.  The whites could not 
toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white 
trash."  The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the 
people poor.  The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small 
slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor.  Soon the slaves 
would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would 
have risen in their might and exterminated them.  The war was expensive to the 
South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all 
it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies.  
He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us.  
His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to Hooker's command in the valley 
below.  From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from 
Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 
29th an attack was made on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps.  When the 
battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry.  He had three 
miles to march to reach Geary.  On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from 
a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded.  
Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy 
had time to intrench, taking many prisoners.  Leaving sufficient men to hold 
this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary.  Before he got up, Geary had been 
engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force.  The night was so 
dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of 
the flashes of their muskets.  In the darkness and uproar Hooker's teamsters 
became frightened and deserted their teams.  The mules also became frightened, 
and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy.  
The latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn.  By four 
o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was 
never afterward disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or 
five wounded.  The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured.  In 
the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded.  I 
never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and 
fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to 
the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of 
the two armies.  As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of 
the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then 
bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the Tennessee River at the 
foot of Lookout Mountain.  This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off 
west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew 
their water from the same stream.  As I would be under short-range fire and in an 
open country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed 
some distance to the rear.  I rode from our right around to our left.  When I 
came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, "Turn out 
the guard for the commanding general."  I replied, "Never mind the guard," and 
they were dismissed and went back to their tents. Just back of these, and about 
equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets.  The 
sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the 
commanding general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant."  Their line in a 
moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two 
armies.  At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and 
which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps.  
General Longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a 
little different shade from our uniform.  Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, 
I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he 
belonged to.  He was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged 
to General Longstreet's corps.  I asked him a few questions--but not with a view 
of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode off.



CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S SITUATION--
ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now began to 
look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in about as desperate a 
condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged.  
He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the 
Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of.  The 
roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since 
been exhausted.  His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined 
the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky. East Tennessee 
still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply 
ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, 
salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.  His 
instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up 
supplies.  The distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a 
hostile country.  His entire command could not have maintained the road if it 
had been completed.  The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much 
other damage done.  A hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands 
infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in 
the West.  Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only 
a short distance away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at Eastport, 
Mississippi.  Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself from 
Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from St. Louis on small 
steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at Eastport.  These he got.  I 
now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with 
his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without delay.  This order was borne to 
Sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated 
over Muscle Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th.  In this Sherman was 
notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East Tennessee, 
and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops were in the best 
position to beat them there.  Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, 
abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once.  On the 1st of 
November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, 
Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at 
Eastport, with Blair bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, 
all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville.  All indications 
pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in East 
Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route.  A single track could 
not do this.  I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. 
Dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently 
directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north 
towards Nashville, and to rebuild that road.  The road from Nashville to Decatur 
passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of 
considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed.  All the bridges 
over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy.  
All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as 
they knew how to destroy them.  All bridges and culverts had been destroyed 
between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and 
Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite.  The rebuilding of 
this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the 
army.  From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the 
road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad 
builder.  He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, 
picks, and spades.  With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them 
against surprises by small parties of the enemy.  As he had no base of supplies 
until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to 
consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the 
surrounding country.  He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could 
find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as 
could be found.  Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the 
line of the army.  When these were not near enough to the troops for protection 
they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.  Blacksmith shops, 
with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner.  
Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad 
and bridge building.  Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and 
cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed.  Car-builders 
were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars.  Thus every branch of 
railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with 
food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer 
except what the command itself furnished.  But rails and cars the men could not 
make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we 
already had worked to its full capacity.  There were no rails except those in 
use.  To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General 
McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had 
except ten.  I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river 
and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and 
rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville.  
The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock 
and, as far as he could, bridge material.  General Dodge had the work assigned 
him finished within forty days after receiving his orders.  The number of 
bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and 
wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or 
were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.  Their presence there, 
however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless 
condition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness.  Dispatches were constantly 
coming, urging me to do something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to 
the importance of holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much 
concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc.  We had 
not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a 
supply train.  Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither 
supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for 
the men he had.  There was no relief possible for him except by expelling the 
enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand 
troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside.  
The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could 
be done until Sherman should get up.  The authorities at Washington were now more 
than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with 
dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his 
relief.  On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I 
ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the 
return of the troops that had gone up the valley.  I directed him to take mules, 
officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary 
artillery.  But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single 
piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the 
order.  Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best 
I could; urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get 
forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he 
should be relieved.  All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence 
in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.  He even 
suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of 
Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more 
difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin.  
Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but from there to Knoxville he had 
to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and 
it was adopted.  On the 14th I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport.  His whole force will be ready to 
move from there by Tuesday at farthest.  If you can hold Longstreet in check 
until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to 
yourself and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here and 
place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former 
take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies.  
Sherman would have been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving 
him some thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received.  Being there, you can tell better how 
to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.  With your showing you had 
better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of 
your possessions.  Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across 
the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it 
arrives.  Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is 
expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the 
railroad between Cleveland and Dalton.  Hooker will at the same time attack, and, 
if he can, carry Lookout Mountain.  The enemy now seems to be looking for an 
attack on his left flank.  This favors us.  To further confirm this, Sherman's 
advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton.  The remainder of 
his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, 
thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is 
going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport.  
The rear will only reach there on the 16th.  This will bring it to the 19th as 
the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired.  Inform me if you 
think you can sustain yourself until this time.  I can hardly conceive of the 
enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky.  If they should, 
however, a new problem would be left for solution.  Thomas has ordered a division 
of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and 
inform you.  It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand 
men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got 
even one day east from here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.  That 
being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was 
directed to remain there awaiting orders.  He was in a position threatening 
Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to 
Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in 
person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached 
Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival (*15), 
except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so 
far away.  The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us 
now.  Hooker was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the 
Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp 
opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time 
to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and 
lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a 
line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten 
or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his 
lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station.  
Hooker was to perform like service on our right.  His problem was to get from 
Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross 
the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary 
Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank 
extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's 
rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also.  Thomas, with the 
Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy 
was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry and 
move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and 
to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the 
ridge.  There are two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee 
River east of Chattanooga--North Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, 
flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while 
the South Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and 
empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.  There were 
now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga River, their 
presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in 
the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat.  A few were to 
land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and 
then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river.  The rest were to land 
on the south side of the Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if 
prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the 
north side to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on 
the south side intrenched themselves.  Thomas was to move out from his lines 
facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an attack 
down the valley.  Lookout Valley being of no present value to us, and being 
untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker's orders 
were changed.  His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the established 
route north of the Tennessee.  He was then to move out to the right to 
Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so long as 
Chattanooga was besieged.  It was the key to our line for supplying the army.  
But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even 
after the battle for this purpose was begun.  Hooker's orders, therefore, were 
designed to get his force past Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up 
to Missionary Ridge.  By crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would 
come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the 
valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation.  Orders were accordingly 
given to march by this route.  But days before the battle began the advantages as 
well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered.  The 
passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy.  
It might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it 
at other points where they were more wanted.  After reaching Chattanooga Valley, 
the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had 
to be crossed.  I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout 
Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge.  By marching 
Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at 
the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new 
position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him, and the attack on 
Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his 
line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain.  Hooker's order was changed 
accordingly.  As explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, 
because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for 
the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the 
troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas and Smith 
and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground 
over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected 
to do.  I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state 
of anxiety for Burnside's safety.  Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one 
who did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until 
Sherman's troops were up.  As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, 
Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I 
believe, from Kelly's Ferry.  Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, 
reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection 
on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his 
command, fully appreciating the importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would 
admit of.  By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the head of column, 
but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (Ewing's) was at 
Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken 
from the south.  Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he 
could not be ready for the assault the following morning.  News had been 
received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville.  Burnside had been cut 
off from telegraphic communications.  The President, the Secretary of War, and 
General Halleck, were in an agony of suspense.  My suspense was also great, but 
more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the 
situation.  It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day.  I 
then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of 
the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date.  But the elements were against 
us.  It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was 
difficult to keep the pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at this 
time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville--about 
Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the North.  A 
dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east.  The 
following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on 
Bragg will commence in the morning.  If successful, such a move will be made as 
I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out.  Longstreet passing 
through our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm.  He would find the country so 
bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching 
Kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not 
return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his 
troops could be got up.  The crossing had to be effected in full view of the 
enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain.  Once over, however, the troops soon 
disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to 
view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, until 
they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river.  But when 
Sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, 
it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, 
took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side.  His crossing 
was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the 
enemy of course supposed these troops to be Sherman's.  This enabled Sherman to 
get to his assigned position without discovery.



CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY--SHERMAN 
CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily 
as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's Ferry and 
threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at 
Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was 
received from Bragg which contained these words:  "As there may still be some 
non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence 
would dictate their early withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a 
device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.  
On the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving 
our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet 
at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled.  The 
object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville 
could be captured, and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one 
hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chickamauga. 
The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy 
within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end of 
the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on 
his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief.  I determined, 
therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been 
intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very strong 
for defence during the months it had been besieged.  The line was about a mile 
from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the 
base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles below 
the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the 
right.  All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped 
with artillery.  The important elevations within the line had all been carefully 
fortified and supplied with a proper armament.  Among the elevations so 
fortified was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood.  It owed its 
importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary 
Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was.  Fort Wood had in it twenty-
two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the 
enemy's line.  On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according to instructions, 
moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to 
the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan 
on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek.  Palmer, 
commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and 
southwest..  He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other 
division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved 
to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre.  The picket lines 
were within a few hundred yards of each other.  At two o'clock in the afternoon 
all were ready to advance.  By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy 
could see from his elevated position all that was going on.  The signal for 
advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the 
line.  The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which 
occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines.  These 
too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce 
their advance guards.  But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement 
secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the 
morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time.  The 
fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way.  During the following 
night they were made strong.  We lost in this preliminary action about eleven 
hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, 
including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of 
artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, 
this ended the fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured 
that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easily.  
But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one 
division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's Ferry.  The 
continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge 
at that point in condition for troops to cross; but I was determined to move 
that night even without this division.  Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly 
to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of 
the 24th.  Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again 
changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the Military 
Division.  To him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats 
from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and 
generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer.  During the 
night General Morgan L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the 
pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate 
duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of 
the river.  During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, 
moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and 
placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, 
to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge 
was to rest.  He had to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas 
having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the 
North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with 
thirty brave and well-armed men.  The boats with their precious freight dropped 
down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who 
could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South 
Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was 
made upon the picket guard known to be at that point.  The guard were surprised, 
and twenty of their number captured.  The remainder of the troops effected a 
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results.  
The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee 
was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose.  A steamer was also 
brought up from the town to assist.  The rest of M. L. Smith's division came 
first, then the division of John E. Smith.  The troops as they landed were put to 
work intrenching their position.  By daylight the two entire divisions were 
over, and well covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was 
now begun.  The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and 
the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put 
in their place in the bridge.  By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as 
well as one over the South Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side 
with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south 
bank of the Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge.  By one 
o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of 
Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and 
Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's 
command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from 
that direction.  A good skirmish line preceded each of these columns.  Soon the 
foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed 
closely by their supports.  By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the 
height without having sustained much loss.  A brigade from each division was now 
brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.  The enemy 
did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained.  
There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that 
Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of 
persons in the valley.  But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and 
made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without 
avail.  Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, 
failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, 
and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to 
strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga Station.  All of Sherman's 
command was now south of the Tennessee.  During the afternoon General Giles A. 
Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was 
nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position.  Howard, 
however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and 
was directed to report to him.  With two or three regiments of his command he 
moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee, and reached the point 
where the bridge was being laid.  He went out on the bridge as far as it was 
completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the 
north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and 
the roadway put upon it.  Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm 
between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was 
engaged on the west.  He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, 
Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the Potomac; and Cruft's, 
14th corps, Army of the Cumberland.  Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft 
at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's Ferry.  These troops were all west of 
Lookout Creek.  The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and 
intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if 
attacked.  These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain.  General Carter 
L. Stevenson was in command of the whole.  Why any troops, except artillery with 
a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see.  A hundred 
men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet 
down--against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker 
occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily 
timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even 
in the absence of an opposing force.  Farther up, the ground becomes more even 
and level, and was in cultivation.  On the east side the slope is much more 
gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of 
Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a 
brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing.  The remainder of 
Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of 
the railroad. Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it.  The bridge 
was seized by Gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding 
it.  This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not 
observed.  A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of 
the mountain.  He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket 
of over forty men on guard near by.  He then commenced ascending the mountain 
directly in his front.  By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their 
camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the 
crossing of the bridge.  By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete.  Osterhaus 
was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with 
considerable loss in killed and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing up the 
hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in 
face of the guns on top of the mountain.  The enemy, seeing their left flank and 
rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus.  Soon these 
were up abreast of Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the 
enemy in advance.  By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope 
of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but 
there were strong fortifications in his front.  The rest of the command coming 
up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of 
Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob.  Hooker's advance now made our 
line a continuous one.  It was in full view, extending from the Tennessee River, 
where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, 
over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley, then along 
parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of 
Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the 
upper palisade.  The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible 
to us except at moments when the clouds would rise.  But the sound of his 
artillery and musketry was heard incessantly.  The enemy on his front was 
partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.  During the afternoon 
the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever 
was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark 
where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time.  At four o'clock Hooker 
reported his position as impregnable.  By a little after five direct 
communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga 
to reinforce him.  These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some 
opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin, 
reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left.  I now telegraphed to 
Washington:  "The fight to-day progressed favorably.  Sherman carried the end of 
Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at 
Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, 
and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up.  Hooker reports two thousand 
prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from 
Missionary Ridge."  The next day the President replied:  "Your dispatches as to 
fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here.  Well done.  Many thanks to all.  
Remember Burnside."  And Halleck also telegraphed:  "I congratulate you on the 
success thus far of your plans.  I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that 
any further delay may prove fatal.  I know you will do all in your power to 
relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the 
North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and 
to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens.  On the night of the 24th his 
division, having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper 
bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to 
a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.



CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY--PURSUIT OF 
THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the 
next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.  Sherman was 
directed to attack at daylight.  Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, 
and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had 
gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear 
of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had 
reached Missionary Ridge.  As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move 
without further orders from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full 
view from the top of Orchard Knob.  It remained so all day.  Bragg's 
headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could 
be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost 
disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over which 
there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad 
tunnel, intervenes between the two hills.  The problem now was to get to the 
main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the 
ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first.  
Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his 
command was in motion.  Three brigades held the hill already gained.  Morgan L. 
Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, 
supported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade 
was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured.  The ridge 
is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops were 
advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side.  The 
troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works.  Morgan 
L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge 
and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station, where 
the main depot was located.  The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive 
our troops from the position we had gained, but without success.  The contest 
lasted for two hours.  Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded 
in this assault.  Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and 
made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his 
right.  From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's 
forces moving against Sherman.  Every Confederate gun that could be brought to 
bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him.  J. E. Smith, with two 
brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's 
command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and 
musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy.  He lay here for a time, 
but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled 
to fall back, followed by the foe.  A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops 
into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the 
attacking party back to his intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position 
I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce him.  Baird's 
division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob.  It had to march a 
considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position.  
Bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction.  This was what I wanted.  
But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this 
to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling 
Bragg to mass in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he 
would.  In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and 
did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him.  Hooker was off bright and 
early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above 
named.  He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost 
the immediate advantage I expected from his forces.  His reaching Bragg's flank 
and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge.  
But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief 
could not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, 
ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order 
the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became 
impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made.  The 
centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I 
stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest.  Turning to Thomas to 
inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the 
division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him.  I 
spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour 
before.  He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, 
but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice.  I told him to 
make the charge at once.  He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short 
time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's 
advance before them towards Missionary Ridge.  The Confederates were strongly 
intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-
way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the 
lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and 
Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time.  Many 
rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends 
higher up the hill.  Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.  
The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire 
high to avoid killing their own men.  In fact, on that occasion the Union 
soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.  Without awaiting further 
orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; 
over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 
18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest.  The fire along the rebel line 
was terrific.  Cannon and musket balls filled the air:  but the damage done was 
in small proportion to the ammunition expended.  The pursuit continued until the 
crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate 
barriers at different points in front of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions.  
The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so 
great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men.  Many were 
captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above 
where the enemy crossed.  He met some resistance from troops occupying a second 
hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body 
and of the artillery and trains.  It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without 
halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and 
without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he 
detached to the right and left to surround the position.  The enemy discovered 
the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, 
leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands.  To Sheridan's 
prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the 
bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for 
his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas with staff, 
General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself 
and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed.  
The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, I 
ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front.  
General Thomas left about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was 
already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge.  Wood, who commanded the 
division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, 
but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit.  To the left, in Baird's front where 
Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and 
the contest lasted longer.  I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's 
division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the 
direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the 
enemy had got well out of the way.  The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing 
everything to their left giving way, fled also.  Sherman, however, was not aware 
of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to 
pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his 
reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push over the 
pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to move forward to 
Chickamauga Station.  He ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to 
where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis at 
four o'clock in the morning.  Morgan L. Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the 
tunnel to see if that was still held.  Nothing was found there but dead bodies 
of men of both armies.  The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow 
Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction of the 
bridge at that point.  He got his troops over, with the exception of the 
artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.  Leaving his 
artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with 
the remainder of his command.  At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division 
of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge.  This threw them 
on Palmer.  They could make but little resistance in the position they were 
caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped.  Many, however, were 
captured.  Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, 
extending east of the ridge.  Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that 
immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out; to Halleck I 
sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent 
up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of 
Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was directed to have the 
little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with 
rations and ammunition.  Granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the 
Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knoxville 
accompanied by the boat.  In addition to the supplies transported by boat, the 
men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four 
days' rations in haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army 
of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland participated.  In fact, 
the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the 
Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept 
together, under their respective commanders, during the battle.  Hooker, on the 
right, had Geary's division of the 12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's 
division of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the 
Army of the Cumberland.  Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's 
corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the 
Army of the Cumberland.  There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry.  Indeed, I doubt 
whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this 
intermingling of commands.  All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it 
for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no 
difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage 
the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by 
reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:  first, in sending away his 
ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away 
a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force 
on the plain in front of his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a 
short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed that he 
had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and 
finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be 
conducted by the latter general.  I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before 
the war, the latter very well.  We had been three years at West Point together, 
and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment.  Then we served 
together in the Mexican War.  I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him 
occasionally subsequently.  I could well understand how there might be an 
irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and 
otherwise.  He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible 
temper, and was naturally disputatious.  A man of the highest moral character 
and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. As a 
subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer 
infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to 
detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.  On one 
occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field 
officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time 
acting as post quartermaster and commissary.  He was first lieutenant at the 
time, but his captain was detached on other duty.  As commander of the company 
he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted.  
As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of 
it his reasons for so doing.  As company commander he responded to this, urging 
that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it 
was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it.  As quartermaster he still 
persisted that he was right.  In this condition of affairs Bragg referred the 
whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.  The latter, when he saw the 
nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:  "My God, Mr. Bragg, you have 
quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with 
yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man.  He was brave, honest, intelligent, a 
very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his 
subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to 
maintain.  He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon 
as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason stated, but 
because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought 
he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone."  On several occasions 
during the war he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR 
MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity.  
He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to 
the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have said so in their writings 
since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga were as 
fought.  Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the 
north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and 
get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville.  When Hooker had secured 
that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre.  Before 
Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed 
to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River.  The waters in 
the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's Ferry 
could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it.  
For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were 
originally. _____

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the 
campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by General Grant, 
after his great illness in April, and the present arrangement of the subject-
matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.



CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE --VISITING KNOXVILLE-
CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I 
immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the situation of 
which the President, in particular, was very anxious.  Prior to the battles, I 
had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very 
earliest moment after securing Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers 
which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in 
condition to run.  General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded 
with rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the 
Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. General Granger, 
with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the 
moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops 
to return to their old camps.  With the provisions carried, and the little that 
could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet 
was driven away, after which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of 
food for Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, 
part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to 
start Granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that I was 
going to the front to more fully see the situation.  I was not right sure but 
that Bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached 
Dalton.  In that case Bragg might think it well to take the road back to 
Cleveland, move thence towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a 
sudden dash upon Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat was 
most earnest.  The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, 
abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized 
mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard 
to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took the road 
to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga Station toward the 
same point.  As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff officer 
back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him 
by my orders to start Granger at once.  Feeling now that the troops were already 
on the march for the relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but 
stayed at Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East Chickamauga 
Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from Chattanooga. I 
arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek 
got up.  His men were attacking Cleburne's division, which had taken a strong 
position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate 
army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point.  Just beyond 
the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be 
crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile.  This attack was 
unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily.  Hooker captured, however, 3 
pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the 
field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring 
mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other 
property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton 
destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his troops, where 
he found Palmer had preceded him.  Palmer had picked up many prisoners and much 
abandoned property on the route.  I went back in the evening to Graysville with 
Sherman, remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga until the 
following night, the 29th.  I then found that Thomas had not yet started 
Granger, thus having lost a full day which I deemed of so much importance in 
determining the fate of Knoxville.  Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 
23d of the month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or 
twelve days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if 
not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or 
attempt to retreat.  To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility.  He 
was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have 
been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he 
having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to 
General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of 
Knoxville.  I also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that Burnside had 
now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that 
time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville, having sent 
out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleveland and 
Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned 
to camp.  I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after 
their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become 
satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General 
Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near 
Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in 
their haversacks.  Expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be 
engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. 
The weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less.  
The two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go 
through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that 
there was but little probability of finding much food.  They did, however, 
succeed in capturing some flour.  They also found a good deal of bran in some of 
the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they 
eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being taken for 
his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became 
necessary, that I determined to send a message to him.  I therefore sent a 
member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could 
report to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement 
possible.  Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the battle, and had 
been there even before I assumed command.  Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany 
Colonel Wilson, and did accompany him.  I put the information of what was being 
done for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or 
other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the 
hands of General Longstreet.  They made the trip safely; General Longstreet did 
learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was 
prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows and flats 
as they floated down.  On these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people 
of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions 
generally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union troops.  They also 
drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the 
enemy; so that when relief arrived Burnside had more provisions on hand than 
when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 
757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing.  We captured 6,142 prisoners--about 
50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of 
artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-
arms.  The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, 
because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men.  Bragg had about half 
this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.  It was his own 
fault that he did not have more men present.  He had sent Longstreet away with 
his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus 
reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence 
of the ablest general of his command.  He did this, too, after our troops had 
opened a line of communication by way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with 
Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when 
he knew reinforcements were coming to me.  Knoxville was of no earthly use to him 
while Chattanooga was in our hands.  If he should capture Chattanooga, Knoxville 
with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle.  I have 
never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the 
north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to reinforce 
Longstreet.  He also started another division a day later, but our attack having 
commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back.  It had got so far, 
however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there.  
It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become 
confused as to what was going on on our side.  Sherman had, as already stated, 
crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view 
of Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.  They 
then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops 
on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault.  Bragg knew it was Sherman's 
troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed 
that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee River to the relief of 
Knoxville and that Longstreet was therefore in danger.  But the first great 
blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of.  If 
he had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle.  
It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga 
safely.  It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a 
still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate 
it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the 
attacking party.  The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:  but as he 
reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, 
and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little 
reliance can be placed on this report.  There was certainly great dissatisfaction 
with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a 
disposition to get away if they could.  Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the 
same half year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was 
much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North 
the fall and winter before.  If the same license had been allowed the people and 
press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably 
have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that I 
thought him eminently entitled to promotion.  I was aware that he had previously 
been named by the President for promotion to the grade of major-general, but 
that the Senate had rejected the nomination.  I was not aware of the reasons for 
this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy.  My 
recommendation was heeded and the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the 
authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the fact, 
which caused great rejoicing there.  The President especially was rejoiced that 
Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed.  The safety of 
Burnside's army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been the subject of 
much anxiety to the President for several months, during which time he was doing 
all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few 
thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost 
hourly, to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals 
of like tenor.  He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at 
Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, 
in a starving condition, or overpowered:  and his anxiety was still intense until 
he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or 
more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the State.  
The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on 
and subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee. Foster now 
relieved Burnside.  Sherman made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee 
River in accordance with instructions.  I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, 
and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire 
military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.  While remaining 
at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to 
throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so I 
set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move 
to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to 
claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good 
weather in the spring.  I expected to retain the command I then had, and 
prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of 
having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf.  I expected after Atlanta 
fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by 
way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west.  I was 
preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to 
push through to Mobile if that city was in our possession:  if not, to Savannah; 
and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that 
would then be left to the enemy.  But the spring campaign against Mobile was not 
made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until their 
animals had nearly all starved.  I now determined to go myself to see if there 
was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon 
it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by rail for 
Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of the little steamers previously 
spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to 
the junction of the Clinch with the Tennessee.  From that point the railroad had 
been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains.  I went by rail 
therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days.  General John G. 
Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio.  It was an intensely cold 
winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a 
week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to 
Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back 
to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken 
wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga 
over Waldron's Ridge.  The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay 
could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of 
six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the 
road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee and 
Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal.  They would collect in 
little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of 
my approach before we arrived.  The people naturally expected to see the 
commanding general the oldest person in the party.  I was then forty-one years of 
age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years 
my senior.  The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an 
opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house.  It also gave me 
an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about 
their general.  Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause 
than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, 
and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's 
ride.  I was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along 
who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher 
dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.  Under the 
rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control 
of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, 
and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers.  The operators 
possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically 
independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had 
to report to the War Department through General Stager all the dispatches which 
they received or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville, because that 
was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from 
there.  As I have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during 
this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my 
division and to the War Department without my dispatches being read by all the 
operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted.  Accordingly 
I ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, 
of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet man who 
certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters 
could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain Comstock as 
directed by me, stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give 
it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else.  I told him I would see 
whether he would or not.  He said that if he did he would be punished.  I told 
him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that 
punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat 
remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his 
disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded.  When I returned 
from Knoxville I found quite a commotion.  The operator had been reprimanded 
very severely and ordered to be relieved.  I informed the Secretary of War, or 
his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could 
not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders.  It was absolutely necessary 
for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished 
if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished 
anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the 
Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had 
another little spat.  Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and 
control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took 
command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited 
any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had 
approved it.  This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders 
that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had 
examined them and given his approval.  He never disturbed himself, either, in 
examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders 
which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would 
sanction them.  I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary 
apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-Chief of the 
Army.  But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he should go 
with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside assured him that 
with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he 
would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of this 
offer.  As before stated Sherman's command had left their camps north of the 
Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without 
coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps 
by the end of that time.  The weather was now cold and they were suffering, but 
still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for 
the good of the cause which had brought them into service.  Sherman, having 
accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old 
camp on the Tennessee River.



CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE --COMMISSIONED 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST INTERVIEW 
WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his forces 
from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman suggested that 
he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department 
and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what 
Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to 
impede its navigation by our boats.  He expected also to have the co-operation 
of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore.  Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, 
and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to 
Vicksburg.  He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command, 
and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in 
all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his 
headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of 
cavalry scattered west of him.  He determined, therefore, to move directly upon 
Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's department, 
and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.  Hurlbut had 7,000 
cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a 
force of about 7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be 
south-east from Memphis.  Smith was ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with his 
surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the 
enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather.  When these 
scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of General 
Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-
disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.  Smith's 
command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the 
lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had had.  The fact is, 
troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, 
improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by 
percentage.  The difference in result is often decisive victory instead of 
inglorious defeat.  This same difference, too, is often due to the way troops 
are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried 
on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting 
with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and with no great 
deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi.  This 
latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the 
9th.  Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply 
of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, however, there were indications 
of the concentration of Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his 
army close together.  He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy 
who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, 
Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward 
Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in thoroughly destroying 
the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from 
Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had 
gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing 
of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg.  There he learned 
that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the 
Ohio River, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until 
the 11th.  Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's 
favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement with 
him against Shreveport, subject to my approval.  I disapproved of Sherman's 
going himself, because I had other important work for him to do, but consented 
that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain 
absent must be limited.  We must have them for the spring campaign.  The trans-
Mississippi movement proved abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and siege, had 
while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so 
dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained permission to go to St. 
Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find 
him alive on my arrival.  While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to 
turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters 
with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with 
Washington, just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make 
preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee co-
operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi.  I directed Thomas, and Logan 
who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south 
against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making 
him keep as many troops as possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two 
divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and 
two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee.  Seeing that Johnston had 
depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, 
besides Stanley's division which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, 
and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this 
movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet 
had received.  My object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part 
of the preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the 
Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he 
thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he 
was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his 
whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect 
the most for their cause.  I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that 
view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if 
possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had not 
moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, 
that the object of the movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving 
eastward and might be in danger.  Then again on the 21st, he not yet having 
started, I asked him if he could not start the next day.  He finally got off on 
the 22d or 23d.  The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a 
new position quite as strong and farther to the rear.  Thomas reported that he 
could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly 
starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired.  He soon fell 
back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.  He could not carry supplies 
with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the 
country.  Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, 
while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs.  On the 2d of March, 
however, I learned of Sherman's success, which eased my mind very much.  The 
next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed 
through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February.  My nomination had 
been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d).  
I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the 
day following that.  The commission was handed to me on the 9th.  It was 
delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of 
his Cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few 
other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, 
as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on 
paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in 
advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply.  The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its 
reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, 
are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in 
the Army of the United States.  With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a 
corresponding responsibility.  As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, 
it will sustain you.  I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for 
the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied:  "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for 
the high honor conferred.  With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in 
so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to 
disappoint your expectations.  I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now 
devolving on me; and I know that if th